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A Review of the New UK Energy Bill: 
Very Fancy Footwork! 
Uisdean Vass 
INTRODUCTION1 
The United Kingdom Department of Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC) unveiled its much–anticipated new Energy Bill, which is to 
become the future Energy Act 2016, to an expectant oil industry in July 
2015. Published on July 10, the Bill had its second reading in the House 
of Lords on July 22. The Bill is presently before the House of Lords 
Committee. This article looks at the Bill as it existed on September 14, 
2015 following the third Committee sitting. The fourth Committee sitting 
took place on October 14 and the Bill was submitted to Lords Report on 
October 19.2 
Together with the highly important Sections 41 and 42 of the 
Infrastructure Act of 2015, the Energy Bill will, upon enactment, 
constitute the legislative implementation of the influential Wood Review 
issued in February 2014.3 The Bill has cross-party support, and, while it is 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2015, by UISDEAN “HUGH” VASS. 
  Uisdean “Hugh” Vass is an oil and gas partner with the United Kingdom 
law firm Bond Dickinson LLP. He is based in the Aberdeen office and specializes 
in upstream oil and gas work whether in the UK or internationally. Uisdean is a 
1985 LLM graduate of LSU Law School and is qualified to practice in Louisiana 
and Scotland. In 2007 he won the Scottish Corporate Lawyer of the Year Award. 
 1. References to license “model clauses” are to the latest version of model 
clauses, The Petroleum Licensing (Production) (Seaward Areas) Regulations 
2008, 2008, S.I. 2008/225 (U.K.). 
 2. For legislation to be enacted in the central Westminster Parliament, a bill 
must either be introduced in the (unelected) House of Lords or the (popularly 
elected) House of Commons. As it happened, the Energy Bill was introduced in 
the Lords. Introduction and publication of the bill occurs at the formal First 
Reading. A Second Reading then occurs, in which debate is held on broad 
principle. Then the bill progresses into Committee stage, where interested 
legislators propose amendments. Next, the bill goes to a report of the full 
legislative chamber. The bill then passes to the other House and goes through the 
same process. If the bill successfully passes through both Houses then there is a 
conference between the Houses to finalize any discrepancies. Thus, a final agreed 
bill goes to Her Majesty for Royal Assent. Upon receiving Royal Assent, the bill 
becomes law and is published as a statute. 
 3. A detailed analysis of the Wood Review was provided in Bond Dickinson 
L.L.P.’s Summer 2014 Oil & Gas Newsletter. Uisdean Vass, Sir Ian Wood’s 
Review: A UKCS Game Changer?, OIL & GAS NEWSLETTER (Bond Dickinson 
L.L.P., United Kingdom), July 2014, at 2, available at http://www.bonddickinson 
.com/sites/default/files/bon_dic_1296_oil_and_gas_-_newsletter_jun14_v7.pdf. 
A review of the Infrastructure Act 2015, the OGA Call to Action (February 2015), 
the Government Response to Call for Evidence on the Wood Review (March 
60 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IV 
 
 
 
not yet law, the Bill does reflect the essential thinking of the DECC and 
the Oil and Gas Authority (OGA).4 
The Infrastructure Act and the Energy Bill represent a coordinated 
attempt to transform the face of regulatory authority in the UK offshore 
oil industry. Not only will the OGA become a new regulator—it will be a 
new kind of regulator. Made up of sixty-nine sections (sixty-four of which 
are on oil and gas), the Energy Bill deals with multiple subjects in a highly 
technical manner.5 While dense, these sections are so integral to the future 
of the industry that a detailed review is at least worthwhile and, in some 
ways, imperative. 
This article summarizes the most significant provisions and raises the 
questions of most import to United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS) 
oil companies.6 Part I necessarily begins with a detailed and foundational 
analysis of the relevant parts of the Infrastructure Act’s crucial Section 41. 
Part II examines various provisions of the OGA that possess a high level 
of interconnection with one another and whose relationship with Section 
41 of the Infrastructure Act is key. A summary of the overall view is stated 
in the Conclusion. 
                                                                                                             
2015), the OGA Framework Document and the Budget was presented Bond 
Dickinson L.L.P.’s Spring 2015 Oil & Gas Newsletter. Uisdean Vass, The UK 
Oil and Gas Regime – a Fast Moving Target, OIL AND GAS NEWSLETTER (Bond 
Dickinson L.L.P., United Kingdom), Spring 2015, at 3, available at http://www 
.bonddickinson.com/sites/default/files/oilgasnewsletter-final_1.pdf. 
 4. See generally Energy Bill, 2015–16, H.L. Bill [62] (U.K.) [hereinafter 
Energy Bill]. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Discussions of levies and renewables, covered in Energy Bill §§ 63–66, 
are reserved for another day. While there are only two sections in the Energy Bill 
relating to onshore wind projects, it is Energy Bill § 66 which closes the 
renewables obligations to new onshore wind projects that is driving what is a very 
rapid timetable for the Bill. The government is proposing to close that scheme to 
new entrants as of March 31, 2016; failure to obtain Royal Assent for the Bill by 
that time could cause substantial embarrassment to the government and would 
potentially undermine the purpose of the closure policy. The government has 
elected to use primary legislation to implement this policy to avoid the kind of 
legal challenges that arose when similar steps were taken in relation to large scale 
solar projects using secondary legislation. The downside of this approach, though, 
is that no-one has any certainty on what the final form under the Bill will be until 
the Bill is passed by Parliament. DECC cannot guarantee that the final position 
for onshore wind will not be worse than that under the government’s proposals. 
As a result, commercial lending to new onshore wind projects has for all intents 
and purposes stopped. For this reason, DECC is very keen to achieve Royal 
Assent in January 2016. 
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I. INFRASTRUCTURE ACT 2015, SECTION 41 
Section 41 of the Infrastructure Act 2015 provides the foundation upon 
which the Energy Bill is built.7 That Section amends the Petroleum Act 
1998, adding new Subsections 9A–I.8 Section 9A(2) requires the Secretary 
of State9 to “produce one or more strategies” to achieve the “principal 
objective” of “maximising the economic recovery of UK petroleum” 
(MER).10 The “strategy” intends to serve as a variant of secondary 
legislation and must be laid before Parliament.11 The key words “principal 
objective” are defined in Section 9A(1) as maximizing recovery through: 
(a) development, construction, deployment and use of equipment 
used in the petroleum industry (including upstream petroleum 
infrastructure), and 
(b) collaboration among the following persons: 
i. holders of petroleum licences; 
ii. operators under petroleum licences; 
iii. owners of upstream petroleum infrastructure; [and] 
iv. persons planning and carrying out the commissioning of 
upstream petroleum infrastructure.12 
Section 9C requires the parties listed in Section 9A(1)(b), collectively 
known as the MER Parties, to act in accordance with the strategy.13 
However, oil service companies are not MER Parties and are not subject 
to this legislation. Even so, Section 41 does not provide any sanction if the 
MER Parties fail to follow the strategy.14 Under Section 41, the MER 
Parties are not obligated to comply with “the principal objective” but only 
the “strategy.”15 The “strategy” is intended to have the force of secondary 
legislation, but it is used in both the Infrastructure Act and the Energy Bill 
in its basic, uncapitalized form. To clarify its intended form as that of a 
legal instrument, we now refer to it as the “Strategy.” 
                                                                                                             
 7. Infrastructure Act 2015, c.7, § 41 (U.K.). 
 8. Id. 
 9. All references in this article to the “Secretary of State” refer to the 
Secretary of State of the DECC. 
 10. Id. §§ 41(9A)(1)–(2). 
 11. Id. § 41(9G). 
 12. Id. § 41(9A). 
 13. Id. § 41(9C). 
 14. See Infrastructure Act 2015, § 41. 
 15. See id. § 41(9)(C). 
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The Strategy must be devised to achieve the principal objective—MER. 
Critically, however, neither the Infrastructure Act nor the Energy Bill define 
MER. Commencement of Strategy consultation is due this autumn, but no one 
presently knows what the Strategy will look like.16 At this stage, experts are 
concerned that, vis-à-vis individual MER Parties, MER will be an 
unquantifiable duty, partially or wholly unrelated to a particular MER Party's 
licenses or assets.17 As the Wood Review states, “ . . . the key principles of 
MER UK . . . [would require MER Parties] . . . to act in a manner best 
calculated to give rise to the recovery of the maximum amount of petroleum 
from UK waters as a whole, not just that recoverable under their own 
licences.”18 
Objectors might argue that the “Strategy” is, in fact and for practical 
purposes, MER, but that assertion would be false.19 As will be shown, key 
provisions in the Energy Bill turn on the concept of the “principal 
objective”20 as opposed to the MER Strategy.21 
What power, then, does Section 41 confer on the Secretary of State in 
devising the Strategy? Upon review, Section 41 is somewhat opaque on 
this issue, and Sections 9A(2) and (3) are skeletal.22 What is clear is that 
the conferred power includes the right to create entirely new legal 
obligations.23 
Nevertheless, the government’s approach appears to be the creation of 
a new regulatory structure alongside the existing licenses and statutes. 
Neither the Energy Bill nor the MER Strategy will formally amend 
existing licenses, contrary to the Wood Review’s recommendations.24 The 
Energy Bill does heavily amend existing legislation, but mainly as a means 
                                                                                                             
 16. See generally Department of Energy & Climate Change, Funding the Oil and 
Gas Authority: Government Response, URN 15D/431 (2015) for further insight. 
 17. Id. at 8–9. 
 18. Sir Ian Wood, UKCS Maximising Recovery Review: Final Report, WOOD 
REVIEW 6 (2014) (emphasis added). 
 19. Some analysts believe that the Strategy will assert specific legal 
obligations but ultimately require MER Parties to otherwise pursue MER as a 
catch-all. That may be so, but at this stage in the analysis the “principal objective” 
is a distinct concept from the “Strategy,” so this reviewer will preserve the 
distinction. Logically, the “principal objective” or “MER” must be distinct from 
the “Strategy” to be achieved. 
 20. Id. § 41(9A)(1). 
 21. Id. § 41(9A)(2). 
 22. See Infrastructure Act 2015, § 41 (stating that the Secretary “must 
produce one or more strategies for enabling the principal objective to be met” 
which “may [or may not] relate to [the enumerated] matters . . . mentioned in 
subsections [9](1)(a) and (b).”). 
 23. See id. 
 24. Compare Energy Bill, 2015-16, H.L. Bill [62] (U.K.) with Wood, supra 
note 17. See also Sir Ian Wood’s Review: A UKCS Game Changer?, supra note 3 
for more information. 
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to transfer legislative powers from DECC to the OGA. The Strategy will 
be key to the new regulatory structure; fully assessing the new regime is 
impossible without knowing what form the Strategy will take. 
A last key question is whether the MER Parties will be obligated to 
act in accordance with the Strategy only vertically, in their relationship 
with the OGA, or also horizontally, in their relationships with other MER 
Parties, DECC, the supply chain, and outside parties.25 This article posits 
that the new Petroleum Act Section 9C imposes on the MER Parties a duty 
to act in accordance with the Strategy, which is owed to both the OGA and 
all others.26 If this theory is correct, the Strategy will effectively change 
the law of contract for MER Parties and will be directly imported into 
offshore licenses, joint operating agreements, offshore commercial 
agreements, negotiations, and re-negotiations. Under these circumstances, 
judges and arbitrators will have to interpret and apply the Strategy in 
ordinary dispute resolutions, in addition to the OGA and DECC in 
traditional license disputes. 
Finally, the Strategy, in practice, may be difficult to define and apply 
as a regulatory or contractual principle because it may mean very different 
things for different companies. The Strategy and its application must 
necessarily be situational, but to what extent remains uncertain. Some 
licensees are new entrants with a single promote license, while others own 
vital infrastructure that is ripe for decommissioning. Diverse licensees 
may be more or less impacted by the Strategy. Some oil companies have 
the access to finances, people, equipment, and skills necessary to readily 
assume new projects, while others do not. Should their Strategy 
obligations vary based on corporate ability? The Energy Bill throws some 
interesting light on these questions, particularly in Section 14(4), 
discussed infra. 
                                                                                                             
 25. See Energy Bill, 2015-16, H.L. Bill [62] sched. para 2 (U.K.) (stating that 
the Energy Bill would amend the new Petroleum Act Subsection 9A(2) created 
by Section 41 of the Infrastructure Act 2015 to make the OGA responsible to 
produce the MER Strategy); see also id. sched. paras 3–7 (amending provisions 
to ensure the OGA is in charge of the Strategy process while preserving the 
Secretary of State’s final decision to lay the Strategy before Parliament). 
 26. See Infrastructure Act 2015, § 41(9)(C) (stating that MER Parties “must 
act in accordance with the current [S]trategy or [S]trategies when planning and 
carrying out [upstream] activities.”). The statute is silent as to whom the duty is 
owed except that Energy Bill makes it clear that the duty is [at least] owed to the 
OGA. In terms of policy, it can be argued that the Strategy would be more 
effective if it was owed to all persons. At this time the issue is unclear. 
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II. ESTABLISHMENT AND FUNCTIONING OF THE OGA 
1. Energy Bill Sections 1–7 
 The OGA is established as an autonomous authority under the control 
of DECC.27 The OGA will acquire both onshore and offshore 
responsibilities. However, the great majority of the Energy Bill provisions 
only apply to offshore duties. Part 2 of the Energy Bill28 applies only to 
the offshore regulatory system, which is the Territorial Sea and 
Continental Shelf as opposed to the onshore system’s land and Internal 
Sea.29 The very lengthy schedule to the Energy Bill transfers numerous 
licensing and regulatory powers now carried out by the OGA through 
DECC to the new autonomous regulator. Yet, DECC will retain authority 
over important administrative oil and gas decision-making, including 
license transfers and many critical aspects of decommissioning. The 
Energy Bill is expected, through amendment, to bolster OGA's 
decommissioning powers this autumn. Crucially, DECC will remain the 
governmental party in all prior and future licenses. Licenses therefore 
remain a “contract” between the licensee and DECC. 
The OGA must observe certain priorities in its decision-making, laid 
out in pertinent part in Section 4(1), as follows: 
Minimising Future Public Expenditure 
The need to minimise public expenditure relating to, or arising 
from, relevant activities. 
Security of Supply 
The need for the United Kingdom to have a secure supply of 
energy. 
                                                                                                             
 27. Energy Bill, 2015-16, H.L. Bill [62] cl. 1–2 (U.K.) (declaring the OGA’s 
autonomous authority from the Crown and stating its corresponding functions); 
See also id. cl. 5–7 (discussing the DECC's powers over the OGA). 
 28. Id. cl. 12–60. 
 29. See id. cl. 12–60; See also cl. 2(2) (giving the Secretary of State power to 
transfer to OGA certain functions presently carried out by DECC), and cl. 2(6) 
(stating that these functions include DECC`s authority to run the onshore licensing 
system). 
2015] FANCY FOOTWORK 65 
 
 
 
Collaboration 
The need for the OGA to work collaboratively with the government 
of the United Kingdom and with persons who carry on, or wish to 
carry on, relevant activities. 
Innovation 
The need to encourage innovation in technology and working 
practices in relation to relevant activities. 
System of regulation 
The need to maintain a stable and predictable system of regulation 
which encourages investment in relevant activities.30 
It is important to keep the five-fold priorities of Section 4(1) in mind 
while reviewing the more substantive provisions of the Energy Bill. 
Presumably, failure to adequately weigh these priorities, where relevant, 
could be used to ground a claim of judicial review? 
2. Definitions & Non-Binding Dispute Resolution—Energy Bill Sections 
12–22. 
Sections 12 through 22 embody a key recommendation of the Wood 
Review: A qualifying dispute exists if at least one party to the dispute is a 
MER Party and the issue relates either to the fulfilment of the principal 
objective (as opposed to the Strategy) or relates to activities carried out under 
an offshore license excluding third party access (“TPA”) applications under 
Energy Act 2011, Section 82.31 
The word “dispute” is not defined. It could represent a narrow concept 
where, for example, suit has been filed; it could alternatively contemplate 
broad applications whereby the parties cannot agree to vital new contractual 
terms relevant to MER. A qualifying dispute may be referred for OGA 
resolution either by a MER Party who is a party to the dispute32 or by the 
OGA of its own motion.33 
In procedural terms, the OGA is given considerable coercive power to 
prosecute the dispute resolution process—including the enforceable rights to 
seek information and control the attendance of individuals.34 However, the 
                                                                                                             
 30. Id. cl. 4(1) (emphasis added). 
 31. Id. cl. 14(4). In practice very few TPA disputes have reached the stage of 
a Section 82 application being filed—so little is excluded. 
 32. Id. cl. 15(1). 
 33. Id. cl. 17(1). 
 34. Energy Bill, 2015-16, HL Bill [62] cl. 19, 20 (U.K.). 
66 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IV 
 
 
 
ultimate decision, called a recommendation, is not legally enforceable.35 As 
such, Section 18(4) is provides: 
The OGA’s recommendation must be one which it considers will 
enable the dispute to be resolved in a way which best contributes 
to the fulfillment of the principal objective whilst having regard 
to the need to achieve an economically viable position for the 
parties to the dispute.36 
In essence, the OGA must give its recommendation on any qualifying 
dispute on the basis of what will best contribute to “the fulfilment of the 
principal objective” (as opposed to the Strategy). Any such 
recommendation must result in “‘an economically viable position’ for 
[both] parties to the dispute.”37 Presumably, the OGA must also reach its 
recommendation based on the five-fold priorities of Section 4(1). Does an 
“economically viable position” refer to the project in question being viable 
in isolation or in the context of the overall corporate position of the 
relevant MER Party—or even of its corporate holding group? Whatever 
the answer, is the relevant test subjective or objective? 
At this point, one can ask a broader question: Is the interpretation and 
application of the clearly enforceable the Strategy through sanctions38 
subject to a consideration of “an economically viable position” for MER 
Parties? A related issue discussed in Part 2.5 herein, is whether MER 
Parties can be forced to invest pursuant to enforcement notices. 
If any MER Party failed to follow a recommendation which amounted 
to failing to follow the Strategy or to abide by a license term or condition, 
then that could result in a sanctions notice under Energy Bill Section 37. 
The non-binding recommendation could thus quickly become legally 
enforceable. This is fully consistent with the original proposition of the 
Wood Review: “Failure of a party to accept the non-binding opinion 
[recommendation], to the extent that it is inconsistent with MER UK or 
other licence terms, may result in appropriate sanctions being applied.”39 
The non-binding dispute resolution provisions are without prejudice 
to the normal application of formal dispute resolution mechanisms in 
license, JOA or other commercial contracts. There is a tension between the 
two dispute resolution systems, with clear scope for conflict or 
duplication. Why go through all this trouble for a mere non-binding 
recommendation? 
                                                                                                             
 35. Id. cl. 18(4). 
 36. Id. (emphasis added). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id. cl. 41. 
 39. Wood, supra note 17, at 17. 
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3. Petroleum-Related Information and Samples—Sections 23–34 
The Section 23 defines “petroleum-related information” as 
“information acquired or created by or on behalf of a [MER Party] in the 
course of . . . activities . . . [relating to] . . . the principal objective . . . ” as 
opposed to the Strategy or in the course of carrying out license activities.40 
Documents not subject to legal privilege are excluded. This definition is 
thus very broad and not limited to data. On the other hand, “petroleum-
related samples” are more narrowly defined as substances acquired by an 
offshore licensee in the course of license activities.41 
These sections have a primary narrow purpose and a secondary broad 
purpose. The narrow purpose is to ensure proper preservation of petroleum-
related information and samples by licensees if there is a “licence event” 
namely a transfer or relinquishment of rights under a license or an expiry or a 
revocation of such a license. With the possibility of a license event in mind, 
all licensees (called for this purpose “Responsible Persons”) must work with 
the OGA to agree on an “information and samples plan.”42 If no agreement 
can be reached on the plan, the OGA is empowered to impose one.43 Since all 
licensees, operators, and non-operators must agree on a plan, potential for 
duplicative activity looms. MER Parties must appoint an information and 
samples coordinator to liaise with the OGA. 
More importantly, Section 30(1) gives the OGA a very broad power 
to request any petroleum-related information, which may assist the OGA 
in carrying out a function relevant to the “principal objective” (as opposed 
to the Strategy).44 The only ground of appeal against such an order is that 
the compliance deadline is unreasonable. The OGA is granted other 
powers to request information under the Energy Bill, but this is by far the 
widest. Almost anything can be relevant in some way to the “principal 
objective.” 
While petroleum-related information obtained under Section 30 is 
regarded as “protected material,” it can in principle be published when 
DECC issues regulations allowing publication.45 Section 31(8) gives 
DECC fairly broad discretion in this process, but the Secretary must 
consider: (a) whether the specified time for publication is reasonable given 
the purposes for which the information was originally acquired or created; 
(b) whether the given time would have the effect of discouraging other 
MER Parties from acquiring or creating similar information; and (c) 
                                                                                                             
 40. See Energy Bill, 2015-16, HL Bill [62] cl. 23 (U.K.) (emphasis added). 
 41. Id. cl. 23(b). 
 42. Id. cl. 27(2). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. cl. (30)(1). 
 45. Id. cl. 31(8). 
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benefits accruing to the petroleum industry from information being 
published in the suggested timeframe.46 The Wood Review made the key 
recommendation that offshore data needs to be more widely and quickly 
available. These provisions will allow DECC/OGA to achieve that 
recommendation. 
As is the case with the provision on non-binding dispute resolution, 
these provisions do not formally amend the license. Licence Model 
Clauses 30-33 provide that DECC, as a general rule, must not release data 
generated by a licensee for at least three years from the date the licensee 
should have supplied it, or if earlier, the date upon which the data was 
actually supplied.47 Thus, one rule applies to data under the license while 
a second governs data under the Energy Bill, assuming DECC enacts the 
publication regulations. 
4. The OGA and “Relevant Meetings”—Sections 35–40 
A “relevant meeting” is a meeting—whether involving physical or 
electronic presence—between two or more MER Parties in order to 
discuss “relevant issues.”48 A “relevant issue” is any issue “relevant to the 
fulfilment of the principal objective” (as opposed to the Strategy), or 
relating to activities carried out under an offshore license. The issue, 
however, may not be subject to legal privilege.49 
When a MER Party “knows or should know” that an upcoming 
meeting “will be or is likely to be” a relevant meeting, then the it is 
required to promptly inform the OGA of the existence of the meeting and 
provide details regarding the agenda and documents relevant thereto.50 The 
OGA is entitled to send a non-voting participant to the meeting. 
If the OGA does not send a representative to the meeting, the MER 
Party must timely provide OGA with a written summary of the meeting 
and any decisions reached.51 The idea of the OGA having the ability to 
attend operating committee and technical committee meetings was 
strongly recommended by the Wood Review. However, these provisions 
are burdensome and duplicative for licensees and threaten to swamp the 
OGA with MER Party communications. 
                                                                                                             
 46. Energy Bill, 2015-16, HL Bill [62] cl. 32(4) (U.K.). In balancing these 
factors, the Secretary must have regard to the “principal objective.” Id. cl. 32(5). 
 47. See Wood, supra note 18. 
 48. Energy Bill, 2015-16, H.L. Bill [62] cl. 35 (U.K.). Would a meeting 
between two MER Parties and a DECC representative, or a drilling company be 
a “relevant meeting”? We believe so . . . The key is to have more than one MER 
Party in the meeting discussing “relevant issues.” 
 49. Id. cl. 35(4). 
 50. Id. cl. 41. 
 51. Id. cl. 38. 
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5. Sanctions—Sections 41–60 
Arguably, Section 41 is the most important section in the Energy Bill. 
Section 41 gives the OGA the power to levy a range of sanctions—
enforcement notices, financial penalties, license revocation, and operator 
removal—on any “person” who fails to comply with a “petroleum-related 
requirement.” The latter term describes either the MER Party’s duty to abide 
by the Strategy, a term or a condition of an offshore license, or a requirement 
imposed by the Energy Bill which is sanctionable in itself.52 Section 41 gives 
the OGA the power to sanction a “person”—rather than only a MER Party—
for failing to abide by any of these requirements. However, it is hard to see 
how anyone other than a MER Party could be so sanctioned.53 
Notice that in this case, the sanctionable failure is the failure to comply 
with a MER strategy, as opposed to “the principal objective.” Additionally, 
this section gives the OGA the power to sanction a licensee for failure to abide 
by a license term even though the OGA is not a party to the license and the 
licensee's only contractual right is against DECC as a continuing state party 
on the license. DECC retains the right to enforce license terms. In this 
connection, Section 55 says that where the OGA gives a sanctions notice to a 
licensee, then the matter must be dealt with under Energy Bill sanctions 
provisions and not pursuant to arbitration as provided in the license. This 
result is a little curious because the licensee may only invoke arbitration 
against DECC—the license party—and not the OGA. 
An enforcement notice must specify the petroleum-related requirement in 
question, detail the failure, and command compliance with the requirement 
specifying particular actions, if relevant. How would an enforcement notice 
actually work? Would the OGA have to go to court to get an injunction? 
As it is understood, MER Parties will not be forced to invest through an 
enforcement notice (as potentially required by the Strategy).54 Whatever the 
intentions of the OGA, nothing in the Energy Bill says that MER Parties 
cannot be forced to invest should such investment be required by the Strategy. 
In any event, the “cannot be forced to invest” idea can be confusing. On a 
basic level, the Strategy must require investment of some kind by MER 
                                                                                                             
 52. Id. cl. 41(3)(c). 
 53. Section 41 (1) of the Energy Bill allows the OGA to sanction any 
“person” for failure to act in accordance with the Strategy under Section 9C of the 
Petroleum Act 1998, for failure to comply with any term of an offshore license or 
for violating any sanctionable provision of the Energy Bill itself. See also Energy 
Bill Section 41(3). Only MER Parties are obligated to comply with the Strategy 
under the referenced Section 9C of the Petroleum Act. Offshore licensees are by 
definition MER Parties and the only persons who can infringe sanctionable 
provisions of the Energy Bill are MER Parties. 
 54. See Wood, supra note 18, at 2 (“The additional powers are not designed 
to force operators to invest . . . .”). 
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Parties to be meaningful. The Strategy is necessarily designed to compel 
MER Parties to do what they would not otherwise do, and following the 
Strategy would usually involve some investment or spending. An 
enforcement notice might require a MER Party to commit to a project 
mandated by the Strategy, which requires investment. It is different to say 
that the OGA can compel the actual spending of money, or sinking of steel. 
It could well be that failure to comply with an enforcement notice could 
result in financial penalties, license revocation, or operator removal.55 
However, that simply may be the flipside of failing to follow the Strategy. 
A financial penalty notice must specify the petroleum-related 
requirement in question, detail the failure, require compliance if the failure 
has not already been remedied, and demand payment to the OGA of a 
specific penalty. Currently, the penalty cannot amount to more than £1 
million per occurrence, but the Secretary of State may by regulation raise 
the maximum penalty amount up to £5 million.56 The OGA is required to 
issue guidance on matters it will consider when deciding the amount of a 
financial penalty. 
The license revocation notice must specify the relevant petroleum-
related requirement, give details of the failure, and issue notice of the 
revocation. Energy Bill Section 46 provides that a revocation notice can 
only be given to a licensee. However, if more than one licensee exists, the 
notice can be given to one or more. It is important to note that this 
provision gives the OGA the general power to revoke licenses as to 
particular licensees, whereas DECC may only do so under the license in 
the rather narrow circumstances described in Model Clause 42. 
The OGA is not required to publish guidelines regarding the 
conditions under which it will consider license revocation. This omission 
seems odd, given that revocation is a much more serious matter than 
financial penalty. An operator removal notice must specify the relevant 
petroleum-related requirement, detail the failure, and give notice of the 
removal. As is the case with license revocation, the OGA is not required 
to publish guidelines regarding when it will consider operator removal. 
                                                                                                             
 55. It is worth noting that in the limited circumstances set out in Energy Act 
2011, Section 84(2), DECC already has the power to compel investment in certain 
TPA situations. 
 56. Id. cl. 44. 
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The OGA may not issue a sanctions notice without first issuing a 
sanctions warning notice. The sanctions warning notice must specify the 
relevant petroleum-related requirements, state that the OGA is considering 
a sanction, detail the alleged failure to comply, and inform the recipient 
that it has a period—the representations period—to make a case to the 
OGA on the issues raised. The OGA must determine an appropriate 
representation period. The OGA then decides whether or not to issue a 
sanctions notice.57 
The sanctions notice is effectively a judgment from the OGA that is 
appealable to the Tribunal. The Tribunal that reviews these decisions is 
defined as a “first-tier tribunal.” Appeal of a sanctions notice must be filed 
within twenty-eight days of date of issuance. Appeals can be taken either 
on grounds that there was no failure to comply with the relevant duty or 
that, while there was a failure to comply, the sanction is unreasonable or 
ultra vires.58 
The OGA can publish details of any sanctions notice but, in this 
respect, cannot publish anything that, in the OGA's opinion, is 
“commercially sensitive,” “not in the public interest to publish,” or 
“otherwise not appropriate for publication.”59 
Section 56 gives the OGA important powers to require “a person” to 
provide information relevant to an OGA investigation as to whether that 
person has violated a “petroleum-related requirement” or that would 
otherwise assist the OGA in determining the nature and extent of any 
relevant sanction. The OGA has limited powers to publish this 
information. What showing of “investigation” does the OGA need to make 
to use this information-gathering power? Or to ask the question another 
way: what is the definition of “investigation?” The answer is not clear 
from Section 56. 
Lastly, the OGA must draw up procedures related to “enforcement 
decisions,” which should not be confused with “enforcement notices.” 
Instead, “enforcement decisions” are decisions to issue a sanctions notice 
of whatever kind or “a decision as to the details of the sanction.”60 The key 
element of the Section 59 procedure is that a person or persons making 
enforcement decisions should not be the same person who established the 
supporting evidence. The OGA must issue a statement of proposals on this 
matter. 
                                                                                                             
 57. Energy Bill, 2015-16, H.L. Bill [62] cl. 48 (U.K.). 
 58. Id. cl. 49–51. 
 59. Id. cl. 52(2). 
 60. Id. cl. 59(10). 
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CONCLUSION 
Given the political climate, with a Conservative majority 
government with broad political support, it is a good assumption that the 
Energy Bill will become the Energy Act 2016 in a substantially similar 
form as it exists today. Along with the necessary foundation provided in 
new Sections 9A-C of the Petroleum Act 1998—added by virtue of 
Section 41 of the Infrastructure Act 2015—the new legislative provisions 
will transform the way the United Kingdom oil industry does business 
on the UKCS. The Wood Review has changed the game. 
Yet absolutely key concepts such as “principal objective,” “MER” 
and the “Strategy” remain undefined and obscure. Industry participants 
await the “Strategy” in order to really grasp the impact of the legislation. 
The Energy Bill creates an exceedingly powerful OGA with the 
authority to sanction MER Parties if they fail to follow the Strategy, 
violate license terms, or otherwise commit sanctionable infringements of 
the Energy Bill. Yet DECC's role remains considerable, in both 
regulatory terms, and as a government party to all licenses. 
While the Strategy and the Energy Bill confer major new powers on 
the OGA, the government's approach has been to preserve the terms of 
prior licenses and the terms of prior legislation, notwithstanding the 
transfer of DECC functions to the OGA. Two offshore licensing 
regulators will thus govern activities on the UKCS. 
Too much of the Energy Bill depends on the distinction between the 
principal objective or MER and the Strategy. The OGA must make 
recommendations to decide disputes under Section 19(4) based on a 
“principal objective” which is currently undefined and not binding on 
MER Parties. However, if the OGA goes on to find that failure to follow 
the recommendation amounts to a breach of the Strategy, this failure is 
sanctionable. Will MER issues under the Strategy also be subject to an 
“economic viability” test? How will such a test be formulated? The 
rationale for the “non-binding” disputes provisions has gone heretofore 
unexplained. 
Frankly, the provisions on non-binding disputes, information, 
samples, and meetings make for extensive possible duplication. 
However, the massive sweep of the OGA's information gathering powers 
under Section 30 is impressive. Almost nothing important to a MER 
Party—except for information subject to legal privilege—can be 
shielded from this authority. What will be the impact on transparency? 
The Energy Bill heralds the transition of the old DECC from a 
prescriptive/permitting authority to a directive or shepherding authority 
in the form of the new DECC/OGA. The key issues of MER and the 
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Strategy are still unresolved and must take shape as determinate, limited, 
and coherent concepts. 
While it is evident that one new player—the OGA—will be soon be 
added to the UKCS game, many questions still linger unanswered. The 
regulatory framework feels like a very crowded dance floor, 
necessitating very fancy footwork in constrained places to make the new 
Energy Bill work. 

